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Abstract
In recent years, there has been increasing pressure on public health systems in high-income countries due to high
medicines prices, one of the underlying causes of which are the market monopolies granted to pharmaceutical
undertakings. These monopolies have been facilitated by expanded forms of intellectual property protections,
including the extension of the exclusivity period after the expiration of the patent term concerning medicinal
products. In the European Union such an approach lies in the Supplementary Protection Certificate, a mechanism
formally introduced under Regulation 1768/92/EEC (now: Regulation 469/2009/EC, amended). After more than 20
years of implementation since it was first introduced, the common justifications for SPCs are being challenged by
recent findings as to their functioning and impact. Similarly, legitimate questions have been voiced as to the
negative impact of SPCs on timely access to affordable medicines.
On the basis of an analysis of three medicines for hepatitis C and cancer treatments, the present article critically
engages with the policy justifications underlying SPCs. It then analyses access challenges to a hepatitis C medicine
and an HIV treatment in Europe, highlighting the social cost of the introduction of SPCs. Both the normative and
empirical analyses have demonstrated that the common justifications supporting the SPC regime are deeply
questionable. The addition of SPC exclusivity has also heavily delayed competition and maintained high medicines
prices in European countries. Ultimately, the granting of such extended exclusive private rights on medicines may
result in unnecessary suffering and be a factor in the erosion of access to medicines for all.
Keywords: Access to medicines, Supplementation protection certificate (SPC), Drug prices, Intellectual property,
Generic competition, European Union
Background
In the context of increasing financial pressure on health
care systems within European countries, some European
countries recently introduced treatment rationing (eg
France, Switzerland) [1, 2]. Together, these developments
increasingly threaten the sustainability of healthcare sys-
tems [3]. In 2016, the Council of the European Union
(EU) invited the European Commission to provide an ana-
lysis on the EU pharmaceuticals incentives package [4].
Included in the review was the EU Supplementary
Protection Certificate (SPC), a mechanism created in 1992
to provide additional marketing exclusivity following a
given medicine’s patent expiration.
A heated debate occurred throughout the review. The
originator position firmly holds that extended market
exclusivity is critical to securing growth and incentivis-
ing research and development (R&D) [5]. This position
is grounded in the notion that pharmaceutical develop-
ment is a high-cost, high-risk, stringently-regulated
process effectively resulting in a much shorter exclusivity
period in the market than the 20-year patent term. The
SPC system is hence argued to provide additional guar-
antee and incentive [6–9]. By contrast, the European
generic industry argued that the SPC regime hindered
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their global competitiveness [10]. Answering generic
undertakings’ request for change, the Regulation was
amended and Article 5 now allows generic production
for export to third-countries (‘manufacturing waiver’) as
a derogation and a ‘storing’ option permitting generic
production 6 months pre-SPC expiration to prepare
their products for market launch in the EU [11].
For their part, civil society organisations pointed to
public health-related considerations, including the nega-
tive impact of SPC-extended market exclusivity on the
affordability of medicines, whereby high prices are main-
tained which intensify concerns regarding the sustain-
ability of medicines supply required for the treatment of
all patients [12, 13]. While the five studies commissioned
and published by the Commission in 2017 and 2018
throughout the SPC review investigated the origin, prac-
tices, economic rationale, impact, and legal aspects of
SPCs [14–18], they did not analyse the social impact of
SPCs in depth from the perspective of securing and pro-
tecting the sustainable provision of health care to all pa-
tients in need. In light of these issues, key questions
addressed in the present review include whether and to
what extent SPCs and other pharmaceutical incentive
measures strike the correct balance of interests and the
extent to which SPCs may hinder the availability and
affordability of lifesaving medicines in Europe.
In order to engage in an evidence-based discussion of
the social impact of SPCs, this article begins with a brief
overview of the development of patents and other mar-
ket exclusivity instruments and their impact on access to
medicines. Section two introduces the specific case of
SPCs, including the recent Commission review, while
section three assesses SPCs as a means of offsetting
R&D investments for selected medicines. The fourth
section presents two recent cases of publicly-reported
access to medicines challenges in a number of European
countries. Finally, section five discusses the rationale and
social cost of patent term extensions, such as SPCs, in
light of the right to access medicines as an integral part
of the realisation of the right to health for all.
Methodology and scope
To critically assess the impact of SPCs on access to med-
icines, a review of the existing literature and several case
studies are presented. For the literature review, resources
were obtained from public libraries (eg the British
Library and the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
Library), websites, and online databases (eg Westlaw,
HeinOnline, JSTOR, and LexisNexis). The assumption
underpinning the SPC regime is that SPCs are necessary
to provide a ‘period of effective protection’ ‘sufficient to
cover the investment put into the research’ [19]. To test
this presumption, sofosbuvir, trastuzumab, and imatinib
were selected as case studies. These drugs were chosen
for three main reasons: they all have high therapeutic
value, are included in the World Health Organization
(WHO) Model List of Essential Medicines, and have
been made available at expensive prices whilst generat-
ing enormous revenues as ‘blockbuster’ medicines. For
the three medicines, patent and SPC status, sales rev-
enue, and R&D investment were reviewed. Publicly avail-
able information was relied upon: sales revenue data is
derived from originator supplier financial reports, and
data on investments per product was found in literature,
company reports and media outlets. To assess the social
cost of high prices facilitated by market exclusivity, the
cases of sofosbuvir and the fixed-dose combination teno-
fovir disoproxil fumarate and emtricitabine (TDF/FTC)
are dissected, using a variety of public sources.
Introduction: medicines pricing and SPCs
To undergo a discussion and analysis of the impact of SPCs
on access to medicines in Europe, it is imperative to com-
prehend the evolution of international law on pharmaceut-
ical patents, a processes characterised by constant pressure
for longer periods of exclusivity protection by the pharma-
ceutical industry [20]. Before 1992, a number of European
countries did not provide patent protection on pharma-
ceutical products [21]. At the international level, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) entered into
force in 1995 [20, 22]. Critics have convincingly argued that
TRIPS was drafted by lawyers and economists in the inter-
ests of US-based corporations [23], illustrating the setting
of a ‘neo-liberal agenda of global governance’ [20, 23].
Among other provisions, TRIPS unified the patent terms in
different countries, requiring 20 years’ patent protection
from the date of filing (Article 33) [22]. Consequently,
TRIPS extended patent terms under most national laws,
which previously had often ranged from 15 to 17 years,
although in some cases they could be as short as 5–7 years
[24]. Despite the extended protection period, pharmaceut-
ical sector lobbying persisted seeking even longer exclusiv-
ity by resorting to various legal and regulatory means,
including patent term extensions or restorations.
At the domestic level, one of the most influential
examples in the early shift towards the extension of
pharmaceutical patent terms was the US Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act 1984, often
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act [25]. This Act provided
an extension of the patent term of up to 5 years, thus enab-
ling up to 14 years of an effective statutory monopoly as of
the marketing date [26]. The Hatch-Waxman Act had far-
reaching effects, particularly the legislative reasoning for
granting this extended exclusivity – ie to compensate for
marketing time lost fulfilling regulatory requirements and
to recover R&D investments [26, 27]. In the 1990s in
Europe, several countries adopted similar legislation that
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extended pharmaceutical market exclusivity status upon
patent expiry in the form of SPCs, eg in France and Italy
[28, 29]. To preserve the integrity and the functioning of
the common market, the European Economic Community
established a uniform system for granting SPCs in 1992
[19]. SPCs are not, however, the only EU mechanisms offer-
ing protection beyond patent expiry; other types not dealt
with in this study include the paediatric extension, orphan
market exclusivity, data exclusivity, and market protection.
Such additional protections go beyond the obligations im-
posed by TRIPS and are hence typically referred to as
‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions. The EU systematically tries to im-
pose SPC-type provisions in other countries via bilateral
trade negotiations.
Many such TRIPS-plus provisions have proven detri-
mental to accessing affordable medicines in Europe [30]
and elsewhere [31]. For instance, a study on the public
health impact of introducing patent term extensions in
Thailand found that a five-year market exclusivity exten-
sion would result in an annual increase in medicines ex-
penditure from USD 146.3 to 696.4 million [32].
Similarly, a study on existing Australian patent term ex-
tensions demonstrated that their elimination could save
up to AU $241 million per year on public pharmaceut-
ical expenditure [33]. Following the 2017 conclusion of
the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) and the consequent adoption of an
up to 2 years’ ‘certificate of supplementary protection’
(CSP) following patent expiry [34], a retrospective Can-
adian Parliament study estimated the CSP regime would
have led to an increase in annual medicines expenditure
of CA $392 million (€260 million) if it had been adopted
2 years earlier [35]. The latter examples concern high-
income countries with largely similar market structures
to those found in Europe, serving as appropriate com-
parisons for the purposes of our discussion and analysis
of the actual cost of introducing market exclusivity
mechanisms.
SPCs in the European Union
An SPC is a special intellectual property (IP) right (title)
available for medicinal products, including chemical
pharmaceutical products and biological medicines that
require authorisation by national regulatory authorities
before they can be marketed. SPCs are granted by
national patent offices (NPOs) based on the SPC Regula-
tion [36]. The conditions for the grant of an SPC are
outlined in the Regulation, requiring inter alia that the
SPC be requested within 6 months of the medicine’s first
market authorisation (Article 7(1)), which is protected
by a ‘basic patent in force’ (Article 3(a)), or within 6
months from the grant of the patent if this occurred
after the market authorisation was awarded (Article
7(2)). In addition, the product must not have already
been the subject of an SPC (Article 3(c)). If these condi-
tions are satisfied, the SPC shall take effect at the end of
the 20-year term of the basic patent for a period equal
to the period which elapsed between the filing date of
the basic patent and the date of the first market author-
isation of the medicine, reduced by a period of 5 years
(Article 13).
Strictly defined, an SPC is not a patent term extension,
as that would require amending EU Member State na-
tional patent laws and the European Patent Convention;
nevertheless, the effects of SPC-derived exclusivities are
identical to those derived from patents. In other words,
SPCs de facto enable right-holders to maintain monop-
oly prices and effectively function identically to a patent
extension or restoration. The rationale for introducing
this extension scheme is to make up for exclusivity time
lost between patent registration and marketing author-
isation, since the former usually occurs several years be-
fore the latter [15]. Some argue that this time needs to
be restored to ensure sufficient return on costly pharma-
ceutical R&D expenditures [37].
In 1992, the SPC Regulation, as codified in 2009, cre-
ated a scheme for medicinal products ‘to provide ad-
equate effective protection’ and reduce ‘the risk of
research centres … relocating to countries that already
offer greater protection’ [19]. To have ‘adequate effective
protection’ under the Regulation, ‘the holder of both a
patent and a certificate should be able to enjoy an over-
all maximum of fifteen years of exclusivity’ from the
marketing authorisation [19]. The Regulation assumed
that otherwise, ‘the period of effective protection under
the patent [was] insufficient to cover the investment put
into the research’ [19]. Between 2010 and 2016, 86% of
new medicines introduced had an SPC in at least one
country, and SPC protections have been filed on average
in 18–19 Member States [18]. Meanwhile, concerns sur-
rounding pharmaceutical expenditure and the corre-
sponding threat to healthcare systems’ sustainability
have grown, with medicines constituting 17.1% of the
total health expenditure in the EU and 1.41% of GDP in
2014 [38]; moreover, new medicines spending outpaces
growth in GDP and other healthcare expenditures [39].
In addition, the Commission acknowledges that ‘public
and private payers increasingly grapple with how to af-
ford the rising number of new and often expensive med-
icines’ [3]. In June 2016 the Council of the EU under the
Dutch presidency expressed ‘concern about examples of
a market failure...where patients access to effective and
affordable essential medicines is endangered by very high
and unsustainable price levels’ and concluded ‘that the
incentives in this specific legislation need to be propor-
tionate to the goal of encouraging innovation, improving
patients’ access to innovative medicines with therapeutic
added value and budgetary impact’ [4]. Accordingly, the
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Council requested the Commission undergo an
evidence-based analysis of the impact of some current
incentive mechanisms – including SPCs – on
innovation, availability, and accessibility of medicinal
products [4]; two of the studies procured by the Com-
mission and published in May 2018 specifically investi-
gated the economic impact and legal aspects of SPCs
[14, 15].
Of the studies procured by the Commission, that by
Copenhagen Economics (CE) provides an extensive
overview of the functioning, use, and impact of the vari-
ous IP incentives in Europe, including SPCs [15]. The
study by the Max Planck Institute (MPI) examines the
functioning of the SPC system from a legal perspective
[14]. The latter study points to significant divergence be-
tween the CJEU’s interpretation of the SPC Regulation
and NPO practice, and also between current practice
and the original intentions and limitations in respect to
SPCs. The study therefore calls for greater coherence in
the granting of SPCs, a finding echoed by a Technopolis
report requested by the Dutch government [40]. The
Commission has advanced the idea of a unitary SPC title
at the EU level, in place of national SPCs, in accordance
with the new unitary patent system of the European
Patent Office [41].
On a number of critical issues, however, the studies
reached different conclusions. CE presents a positive co-
relation with the average effective protection period in
countries of export and domestic pharmaceutical R&D
spending [15], while the MPI study reasoned that an in-
crease in innovation after the introduction of SPCs ‘does
not imply a cause-effect relationship with the enactment
or the amendment of that specific regulation’ [14]. The
Technopolis study could not confirm the incentivising
effect of SPCs since the factors driving pharmaceutical
R&D expenditure could not be identified, also noting
that the SPC regulation ‘does not contain any provisions
to favour innovation originating from Europe over that
from elsewhere’ [40]. The latter report also points to al-
ternative incentives such as prizes and conditional in-
vestments in basic research as effective means to spur
innovation.
Additionally, the MPI study questions whether the
availability of patent or SPC protection affects compan-
ies’ decisions to locate research facilities in one jurisdic-
tion or another, emphasising that other factors are likely
of greater importance [14]. Only CE argues that SPCs
could play a role in attracting innovation to Europe,
while conceding that taxation, education, and other fac-
tors are probably more significant in that respect [15].
The Technopolis case studies into atorvastatin, omep-
razole, and losartan estimated the total cost of SPCs to
the Dutch healthcare system to be between €120–660
million for each medicine [40]. The MPI and CE studies
both note that the SPC-induced generic entry delay may
negatively impact healthcare budgets [14, 15]. The CE
study estimated that shifting 10% of total spending from
originator to corresponding generic products would gen-
erate a saving of USD 12.4 billion (€11 billion), ie 1% of
the EU healthcare spending [14].
Combined, the three studies demonstrate the degree
of inconclusiveness surrounding the SPC regime’s im-
pact as an innovation incentive and limited (or non-
existent) influence in attracting R&D activities to Eur-
ope. Absent from the existing reviews of the EU SPC
system, however, are two elements: (1) whether compan-
ies objectively need SPCs to recover R&D investments
and (2) an assessment of the social cost of the SPC
Regulation, further developed below.
SPCs: a fair mechanism to recover R&D
investments?
This section critically assesses the grounds and regulatory
objectives advanced to justify granting additional exclusivity
rights, whether SPCs are necessary to recover R&D costs,
and whether without SPCs the much-needed R&D on me-
dicinal products would not be undertaken within the EU.
The claim that R&D investments cannot be recovered
without extended exclusivity is frequently relied upon
when SPCs or patent term extensions more generally are
discussed, but supporting evidence remains scant. The
key question is whether the patent holder cannot gener-
ate sufficient sales revenue to match or surpass the R&D
investment from market approval to patent expiry, and
hence whether an exclusivity extension to prevent gen-
eric competition should be implemented to do so. This
hence calls for R&D investment calculations and investi-
gating whether the 20-year patent term is indeed too
short to serve its intended purpose.
Defining the R&D investment for a particular medicine
is hampered by a lack transparency in pharmaceutical
markets, particularly as to cost and R&D investment in-
formation for individual products. There is an ongoing
debate related to R&D costs [42, 43], with estimates for
the cost of bringing a new product to the market ran-
ging from USD 320 million to 2.7 billion (adjusted for
2017 USD) [44]. An important factor in this context is
what exactly constitutes an individual product’s R&D
‘cost’, which could arguably be limited to expenses dir-
ectly linked to developing the individual medicine. Yet,
industry and certain scholars argue that the cost of fail-
ures and opportunity costs should also be included, lead-
ing to much higher figures [42, 45]. A 2017 analysis of
ten companies and drugs by Prasad and Mailankody
[44], however, found the median cost of developing a
new cancer medicine was USD 648 million, including
failures; when opportunity costs were added, the median
cost was USD 793.6 million [46]. The authors also found
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that 90% of the medicines’ sales revenues had surpassed
R&D spending a median of 4 years after market approval
(ranging from 0.8–8.8 years), and 80% when failure and
opportunity costs were included [44].
In the absence of exact R&D expenditure data from
pharmaceutical companies on the three medicines se-
lected for this study, publicly available information is
used to establish proxy indicators for the amount of in-
vestment required to bring a product to market. It was
not possible to verify whether the cited figures include
failure or opportunity costs.
For Solvadi®, Herceptin®, Gleevec/Glivec® sales reve-
nues are compared with companies’ claimed R&D in-
vestments and the length of time for which the
product was marketed. Table 1 provides an overview
of originator companies’ annual sales of three high-
priced drugs over the past 14 years. It should also be
noted that, while Gleevec® was first marketed in 2001,
differing data exists for the first 3 years’ sales rev-
enue; for accuracy, this study therefore only focuses
on data from 2004 onward.
Sofosbuvir and Gilead
Sofosbuvir, a highly effective direct-acting antiviral
(DAA) medicine for treating hepatitis C infections, was
first marketed by Gilead as Sovaldi® and is one of the
most expensive pharmaceutical products in the US
[50]. Just 1 year after launch, in 2014 Gilead reported
USD 10.3 billion in global sales of this product [47],
and over USD 20 billion from 2014 to 2017, as indi-
cated in Table 1. Gilead’s actual R&D investment in
sofosbuvir is unknown, though it acquired sofosbuvir
through a USD 11 billion acquisition of Pharmasset in
2011 when Phase III trials on sofosbuvir were nearing
completion [51]. The medicine was approved by the US
Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) in December
2013 [52], and by the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) in January 2014 [53]. Within the first 3 years
after market launch, Gilead’s sales revenue for sofosbu-
vir surpassed the cost of the Pharmasset acquisition,
and in just 5 years the sales revenue was almost double
this investment.
In Europe, Gilead was granted a patent on sofosbuvir
prodrug by the European Patent Office (EPO) [54], due
to expire in 2028, in addition to a patent on the base
compound [55]. Some Member State NPOs also granted
Gilead SPCs that expire in 2029 [56–59]. Whether
Gilead in fact needs an additional 9 months exclusivity
to recover its sofosbuvir-related investment is doubtful:
within 5 years of market approval (and long before the
primary patent expiration) sofosbuvir sales revenues are
nearly double the company’s disclosed investments in
the Pharmasset acquisition.
Imatinib and Novartis
The second example concerns the R&D investment-SPC
relationship for imatinib, sold by Novartis as Gleevec® or
Glivec® (depending on the country). When the drug was
first approved in 2001, the price was set around USD 30,
000 for a years’ supply. With an expected annual sales
revenue of USD 900 million for imatinib in the US
alone, the company would have been able to retrieve
imatinib R&D investments within the drug’s first 2 years
on the market [60]. Novartis allegedly aimed for this
price, since the potential life-prolonging benefit
remained uncertain [61]. However, as the medicinal
benefit of the drug became clear the company increased
its price, which reached USD 92,000 per year in 2012 in
the US [61]. This increase was publicly denounced by
more than 100 experts, including scientists involved in
imatinib’s discovery [61]. According to company reports
(Table 1), imatinib generated over USD 43 billion glo-
bally from 2004 to 2017.
Novartis was granted a patent by the EPO on the
basis compound of imatinib, which expired in 2013
[62]. In addition, Novartis secured an SPC which ex-
pired in 2016 (eg in the Netherlands [63] and France
[64]). As the sales revenue from the first 2 years
after the launch of imatinib (ie 2001 and 2002), not
included in the table above, were expected to suffice
Table 1 Reported global annual product sales by calendar year
for selected medicines according to company annual reports
(2004–2017) (in million USD)a
Year Sovaldi®
(sofosbuvir)
Gilead [47]
Herceptin®
(trastuzumab)
Roche & Genentech [48]
Gleevec/Glivec®
(imatinib)
Novartis [49]
2004 N/A 1162 1634
2005 N/A 1717 2170
2006 N/A 3142 2554
2007 N/A 4027 3050
2008 N/A 4736 3944
2009 N/A 4845 3944
2010 N/A 5212 4265
2011 N/A 5936 4659
2012 N/A 6301 4675
2013 139 6565 4693
2014 10,283 6840 1237
2015 5276 6800 1219
2016 4001 6918 3323
2017 964 7154 1943
Total 20,663 34,277 43,310
aAmounts rounded to millions. Trastuzumab sales have been converted from
CHF to USD using historical exchange rates
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to recover the R&D investment, it is unlikely Novar-
tis actually needed three additional years of market
exclusivity in order to cover its R&D investment.
Trastuzumab and Roche
The third example relates to trastuzumab, a drug sold
by Roche as Herceptin® for the treatment of breast
cancer developed by Genentech. In 1998 the drug
successfully passed Phase III clinical trials and was
undergoing fast-tracked USFDA approval when Gen-
entech signed a licensing agreement in which Roche
obtained all rights to license the drug outside the US
[65]. The agreement stipulated that Roche was to pay
a USD 40 million upfront fee with cash milestones
for product development activities, that global devel-
opment costs were shared, and that Genentech was to
receive royalty payments [66]. In 1999 when trastuzu-
mab entered the market, a sales revenue of CHF 300
million [67], roughly USD 200 million at the histor-
ical exchange rate [68] and equivalent to five times
Roche’s upfront investment of USD 40 million was
reported for the medicine. Between 2004 and 2017,
trastuzumab sales accumulated to USD 34 billion
(Table 1).
In Europe, Roche secured patent protection for
trastuzumab, which expired in 2012 [69]; several
countries granted SPCs extending exclusivity a fur-
ther 2 years [70–72]. The full details of Roche’s in-
vestment to acquire the trastuzumab licence are
undisclosed, though it appears to have been part of
an extended arrangement [67] which ultimately led
to Genentech’s acquisition by Roche in 2009 [73].
While acknowledging these limitations, the idea that
a two-year SPC was necessary to recover trastuzu-
mab investment costs becomes questionable when
sales exceeded five times the upfront investment to
acquire the licence for trastuzumab in the first year
it was marketed.
Based on the available data, the justification for SPCs
that patent protection periods are insufficient to cover
R&D investments [19] appears deeply flawed for all three
medicines investigated. In each case, the sales revenues
surpassed the companies’ R&D investments within 3
years after market launch and more than 10 years before
the end of the basic patent term. The TRIPS-agreed 20-
year patent term would have been more than sufficient
to recover the relevant R&D investment, proving that
the assumed general need for SPCs is incorrect for some
(and potentially more) medicines. These findings also
strongly challenge the relevance of temporal consider-
ations in the SPC approval process. Costs are the only
relevant factor in whether a company has been able to
off-set its investment to develop or acquire a medicine,
requiring precise details on the cost structure of a medi-
cine’s development and a company’s own investments.
High drug prices eroding access to medicines
Ensuring access to all medicines by patients in need is a
core human right obligation of the states in light of the
right of health [74]. Multiple factors impede access to
medicines, price being one of crucial prominence, as
highlighted by a recent UN report [75]. Whereas prices
that are ‘too low’ have resulted in the limitation or cessa-
tion of product supply, prices that are ‘too high’ have
impeded the ability of healthcare systems to ensure med-
icines availability for all patients [76]. In May 2017, the
WHO-Dutch government Fair Pricing Forum indicated
that drug pricing has become a global issue, even affect-
ing the wealthiest of countries [77]. While many factors
hamper access to medicines in Europe (eg manufacturing
quality issues or regulatory delays) the case studies
below highlight how product price (enabled by patent or
SPC market exclusivity) serves as a barrier to treatment
and how medicines prices have threatened healthcare
systems’ sustainability. While the first case study, sofos-
buvir, is a fairly newer medicine, the second, TDF/FTC,
is nearing the end of its market exclusivity meaning SPC
considerations are especially relevant.
Sofosbuvir
The highly-effective hepatitis C treatment sofosbuvir,
discussed above, is marketed at high prices that severely
financially burden health systems globally, includ-
ing in European countries [78]. This results in patients
being denied treatment access. In France, the total cost
of sofosbuvir-based treatments was estimated to be 20%
of total medicines expenditure in 2014 [79], which ‘put
at risk on the medium term the sustainability of the
health care system’ [80]. The government subsequently
restricted treatment provision in 2015 to adults with the
most severe conditions [79]. In 2016 these restrictions
Table 2 Key dates and relevant protection periods for
sofosbuvir, imatinib, and trastuzumab, based on SPCs granted in
France [56, 64, 71]
Product Sofosbuvir Imatinib Trastuzumab
Year of market launch 2013 2001 1999
Year sales revenue surpassed
R&D investment
2015 2003 2000
Basic patent expiry date 26/03/
2028
25/03/2013 15/06/2012
SPC term > 9
months
> 3 years 8
months
> 2 years 1
month
SPC expiry date 17/01/
2029
21/12/2016 29/07/2014
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were formally lifted [81]. With an estimated 130,000
hepatitis C patients and treatment costing €28,000 per
patient or more [82, 83], the cost of DAAs continues to
debilitate the French health system. In Romania, ap-
proximately five hundred thousand to one million
people are infected with hepatitis C, the highest burden
in Europe, yet treatment was limited to 5800 patients
from 2015 to 2016 [84]. In Italy, which also faces a heavy
hepatitis C burden, in 2017 the Ministry of Health
agreed to allow the personal use of unregistered generic
medicines because the healthcare system could not af-
ford treatment for all patients [85]. In Ireland, the 2017
budget of €30 million for the country’s hepatitis C
programme was effectively spent halfway through the
year, forcing authorities to deny newly-registered pa-
tients treatment [86]. Meanwhile, generic versions of key
DAAs, including sofosbuvir, have become available on
the global market, leading to generic competition and
much lower prices [87]; the patent as granted is also
under post-grant oppositions launched by civil society
organisations and other actors [88]. Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) announced at the end of 2018 that it
has obtained generic hepatitis C treatments at a cost of
€75 for a 12-week course [89].
Unless TRIPS flexibilities as voluntary or non-voluntary
licences are considered and implemented, Gilead’s mon-
opoly remains in effect in Europe until 2029, enabling the
company to charge high prices beyond the expiry of the
original patent in 2028. While the sofosbuvir SPC does
not cause the documented access challenges it certainly
appears contentious to grant such a certificate that will
further prevent generic competition, given that sofosbuvir
sales revenue surpassed Gilead’s R&D investment approxi-
mately 2 years after market entry.
TDF/FTC
TDF/FTC, first marketed by Gilead as Truvada®, has
long been used as an effective anti-retroviral medicine
for treating HIV/AIDS; it has been recommended by the
WHO to be used as a PrEP to protect at-risk individuals
from contracting HIV [90]. TDF/FTC is a combination
of tenofovir [91] and emtricitabine, both of which were
developed by Gilead [92]. Gilead applied for SPCs for
TDF/FTC in many European countries, which were due
to expire in 2020 [93].
However, Gilead’s SPC was revoked in France and
Germany [94, 95]. The SPC was also rejected in the
Netherlands [96], as was a preliminary injunction re-
quest by Gilead to prevent generic competition in
Ireland [97, 98]. In other countries, such as Denmark
[99] and Switzerland, [100, 101] the SPC has been main-
tained. In Belgium, a court ruled in favour of Gilead
[102]. These divergences in application of the SPC Regu-
lation stemmed from uncertainties related to the
definition of the condition of having a ‘basic patent in
force’ to obtain an SPC, a question finally referred to the
Court of Justice by the UK High Court in Teva and
others v Gilead [103, 104].
In 2016, a European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control (ECDC) survey revealed that 31/32 Euro-
pean countries identified the cost of drugs as an issue
preventing or limiting PrEP availability, and 24 rated the
issue of high importance [105]. With no generic version
available on the market at that time, the price of Tru-
vada® was thus considered the main access barrier to the
prophylaxis. As of October 2017, several generic versions
of TDF/FTC had been EMA-approved [106] though they
were not marketed in all Member States due to the ef-
fects of the associated SPCs. On 25 July 2018, the CJEU
referred the case back to national courts signalling that
the SPC should be revoked. Table 2 below shows the
fragmentary availability of generic forms of TDF/FTC on
the European market just prior to the ECJ decision.
The SPC status for TDF/FTC in different countries is
indicated in Table 3, which also lists the prices of Tru-
vada® and the cheapest generic forms according to the
available information. As standardised pricing information
is not available across Europe, the available pricing infor-
mation differs greatly between countries. Pricing informa-
tion in Table 3 should thus only be used to demonstrate
the price differences between generic and originator ver-
sions within the same country. The table also details the
availability of generics and whether TDF/FTC for PrEP
was reimbursed in a country as of 23 July 2018.
Where the SPC was rejected or revoked, affordable gen-
eric forms of TDF/FTC have become available, eg in
Ireland, France and the Netherlands. Other than Belgium,
none of the countries where the SPC was maintained reim-
burse PrEP. While no comprehensive data is available on
the use of PrEP in the listed countries in function of the
price, it can be reasonably assumed that few people can af-
ford out-of-pocket expenses of €400 or more for monthly
treatment. These high prices, combined with the lack of re-
imbursement, have compelled individuals to resort to inter-
net purchases for generic alternatives [131]. In England, a
generic version of the drug for PrEP use is only available as
part of a clinical trial which has enrolled 10,000 people
[125, 126]. However, as demand surpassed availability, the
NHS started to facilitate importation, and sales of generics
commenced in a London clinic earlier this year [132]. It is
worth noting that generic TDF/FTC has been available on
the global market for more than 10 years.
Overall, this analysis demonstrates that the Truvada
decision can enable widespread access to generic ver-
sions of TDF/FTC in Europe [106]. With generic prices
53–94% lower in countries where available, the case may
have a profound impact on the affordability of a PrEP
programme, the reimbursement status of TDF/FTC as
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PrEP, and on the ability of users to pay for their own
medicine.
The social cost of SPCs
SPCs can also come at a ‘social cost’. While the concept of
social costs is still matter of debate, it was described by K
William Kapp as the economic problem of ‘tangible and
intangible damages and losses caused by economic activ-
ities … not accounted for in the cost accounts of those re-
sponsible for their production, but are shifted to and
borne by third persons, the whole community or future
generations’ [133]. Kapp later enlarged the notion to in-
clude all damages and harmful effects of private and pub-
lic decision-making if they are the result of the pursuit of
a private gain [133]. In recent years, the factoring of social
cost gained relevance in the context of eg environmental
issues [134], but is also mentioned in respect to obstruc-
tion to competition through information hoarding via
trade secrets claims [135]. As illustrated in Section four
above, high medicines prices constrain the optimal use of
state resources and compel states to resort to treatment
rationing, undermining the enjoyment of the patient’s
right to health. Besides individuals being denied treatment,
potentially causing unnecessary suffering or death, the so-
cial cost of SPCs could be expressed as an opportunity
cost, ie the impeded ability of healthcare systems to invest
in other medicines, commodities, healthcare services, or
quality of care. While outside the scope of this study, the
extended social cost of SPCs appears particularly relevant
for further research and policy considerations.
While SPCs are intended as innovation incentives, they
can hinder the availability and affordability of lifesaving
medicines. It therefore appears that this tool does not
reflect the balance of interests originally intended be-
tween public health objectives and the private industry
incentivisation. The evidence in this study raises valid
concerns as to whether the granting of additional exclu-
sive rights on medicines is eroding access to medicines
for all, favouring profits not connected to the financing
of R&D over social costs.
Recommendations and conclusions
Based on this research as to the sales revenue of and
R&D investments in a limited number of medicines
(sofosbuvir, trastuzumab, and imatinib), it appears that
the EU SPC regime may be based on a false premise that
companies need longer exclusivity periods to compen-
sate for the ‘loss’ of a period of effective protection dur-
ing the market approval process, to enable them to
recover R&D investments. The higher medicines prices
associated with the generic competition delays caused by
SPCs in relation to the three medicines analysed appears
to be an unnecessary cost for society; this cost can be
expressed in financial, but also ‘social’ terms. The SPC
system can ultimately cause unnecessary suffering and/
or death, as healthcare systems or patients are unable to
afford essential medicines for patients.
The evidence provided in this study suggests a more
thorough assessment of the assumptions underpinning
the SPC system is required. Acknowledging that the above
case studies cover a limited number of medicines, a simi-
lar study including more medicines is needed. In view of
the current debates on IP incentives in Europe, it is crucial
that the Commission provides appropriate evidence on
this issue. Moreover, the obstacles to obtaining pharma-
ceutical companies’ actual R&D cost data further demon-
strates the need for greater transparency to enable public
scrutiny of healthcare expenditure. This study raises ques-
tions as to the public benefit of granting SPCs on medi-
cines altogether, or at minimum calls for fundamental
reform to the system and the way SPCs are granted. The
conflation of the notions of time and cost in the granting
of SPCs appears to be particularly problematic.
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